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Abstract— The cyber epidemiological analysis of computer 
worms has emerged a key area of research in the field of cyber 
security.  In order to understand the epidemiology of computer 
worms; a network daemon is required to empirically observe 
their infection and propagation behavior.  The same facility can 
also be employed in testing candidate worm countermeasures. 
In this paper, we present the architecture and design of Pseudo-
Worm Daemon; termed (PWD), which is designed to perform 
true random scanning and hit-list worm like functionality.  The 
PWD is implemented as a proof-of-concept in C programming 
language.  The PWD is platform independent and can be 
deployed on any host in an enterprise network.  The novelty of 
this worm daemon includes; its UDP based propagation, a user- 
configurable random scanning pool, ability to contain a user 
defined hit-list, authentication before infecting susceptible hosts 
and efficient logging of time of infection.  Furthermore, this 
paper presents experimentation and analysis of a Pseudo-Witty 
worm by employing the PWD with real Witty worm outbreak 
attributes.  The results obtained by Pseudo-Witty worm 
outbreak are quite comparable to real Witty worm outbreak; 
which are further quantified by using the Susceptible Infected 
(SI) model. 
Keywords—worm,  witty,  scanning,  hit-list,  cyber  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the SQL Slammer Internet wide outbreak in 2003 
[1], computer network worms have emerged as key security 
threat to the internet and national infrastructure.  The key 
characteristics possessed by worms are; a rapid rate of 
propagation, ability to self–replicate and increased 
sophistication of worm’s code, which have made them highly 
infectious and capable of causing a denial of service attack on 
the internet as in the case of SQL Slammer outbreak.  The 
SQL Slammer worm is considered to be the fastest random-
scanning worm in the history as it has achieved its full 
aggregate scanning rate, of over 55 million scans per seconds, 
only after 3 minutes of its release [1], while infecting 90% of 
susceptible machines within 10 minutes [1,2].  Although, it 
did not contain any malicious payload, the traffic it has 
generated created halted parts of internet by causing a denial- 
of- service attack.   
Hit-list, Flash and Warhol worms are evolving categories 
of worms, capable of spreading even at faster rate than 
random scanning worm.  Staniford et al. [3] simulated Warhol 
and Flash worm in 2002, and predicted that a Warhol worm, 
having an initial hit-list size of 10,000 and scanning rate of 
100 scan/second in a population of 300,000 susceptible hosts 
in address space of 232, is capable of infecting all the hosts in 
15 minutes.  While a UDP based Flash worm with initial 
global size hit-list could saturate 95% of one million 
vulnerable hosts on the internet in 510 milliseconds [4].  
Whilst other reported works [1,5] have presented analysis of 
worms based of reported worm outbreak data, and some  
reported work [4,6] have presented  simulated worms, but no 
previously reported work  has produced the empirical analysis 
of scanning, hit-list or flash worms on large scale network 
with real worm outbreak conditions. Hence there is a need to 
design, implement a pseudo-worm daemon with scanning and 
hit-list functionality, and to empirically analyze its spread on a 
large scale network in order to find epidemiological trends of 
worm outbreaks.  
With the aim of empirically analyzing the propagation of 
network worms, and testing potential countermeasures, this 
paper presents the architecture and design of PWD; capable of 
performing true random scanning and hit-list functionality.  
The key attributes of PWD are; its UDP based propagation, 
user- configurable random scanning pool, ability to contain 
user defined hit-list, authentication before infecting vulnerable 
machines and efficient logging of time of infection.  This 
paper also presents the empirical analysis of Pseudo-Witty 
worm with real exploitable conditions on the Virtualized 
Malware Testbed (VMT) by employing PWD; while obtained 
results are quantified by using Susceptible Infected (SI) model 
[7,8].   
The remainder of paper is presented as follows: Section II 
discusses the lexicon related to computer worms; Section III 
summarizes the relevant previous work related to empirical 
analysis of computer worms and modelling; Section IV details 
the basic design methodology, system design and 
implementation, and key characteristics of PWD; Section V 
presents the experimental methodology, network setup, and 
results and analysis of Pseudo-Witty worm outbreak; and 
finally Section VI concludes the paper with a discussion 
summarizing the findings and identifying any limitations, as  
well as summarizing potential future work in this area.  
II. LEXICON 
A lexicon has been presented for the clarification of the 
following terms, owing to their specific use in this paper.  
A. Computer Worm 
A computer worm is a program that self-replicates and 
self-propagates across a network, exploiting security or policy 
flaws in widely-used network services, without any human 
intervention [9].  For example, SQL Slammer, Witty, Code 
Red [10] etc.  Table I shows different types of worms.  
TABLE I.  TYES OF COMPUTER WORMS 
Worm Description 
Scanning 
A scanning worm employs different scanning strategies 
(random [1], sequential [9], permutation [3] or 
importance [11] ) to spread.  Scanning refers to the 
process of probing a set of IP addresses to identify 
vulnerable hosts [9,12]. For example, Slammer, Code 
Red etc.  
 
Hit-List 
A worm that employs a pre-generated list of susceptible 
IP addresses to infect can be classified as hit-list worm, 
such as Witty [5].   
 
Topological 
A topological worm [9,12] uses an internally generated 
targets list of vulnerable hosts, which is created by 
finding local information on networks such as the 
/etc/hosts file on UNIX systems, or local topological 
information by using ARP caches tables and netstat. 
 
Meta-Server/ 
Search 
A meta-server worm [9,12] uses externally generated 
targets list of vulnerable hosts, which is maintained by a 
separate server, such as a matchmaking service’s meta-
server e-g. Gamespy or web searches using Google in 
order to find vulnerable targets. 
Worm Description 
 
BGP 
Routing 
A BGP routing worm [6] uses BGP scanning 
techniques, which employ BGP routing tables to narrow 
the scanning addresses space.  This type of worm is 
capable of targeting particular systems within specific 
geographic location such as a specific country, ISP or 
autonomous system, and can spreads 2 to 3 times faster 
than tradition random scanning worms. 
 
Warhol 
Warhol worm [3] is a hypothetical, simulated, and very 
fast spreading worm that uses combination of a hit list 
(which helps initial spread) and permutation scanning 
(which keeps its high infection rate higher than random 
scanning). 
 
Flash 
Staniford et al. [4] simulated the extension of Warhol 
worm, which they named, the Flash worm.  The flash 
worm contains an initial global size hit list.  They 
hypothesized that UDP based flash worm can infect 95 
percent of one million vulnerable hosts in 510 ms, while 
a TCP based flash worm can infect the same population 
in 1.3s. 
 
B. Zero-Day Worm 
A zero-day worm is a type of worm that exploits a zero-
day vulnerability that has not been patched or widely 
acknowledged at the point of exploitation [9,12].  For 
example, Code Red and Slammer both used exploit zero-day 
vulnerabilities. 
C. Empirical Analysis 
In this paper, empirical analysis is based on launching a 
pseudo-worm with real worm attributes in a real, isolated 
network and analyzing its behaviour.   
D. Epidemiological Analysis 
In this paper, epidemiological analysis is based on rate at 
which total number of worm susceptible hosts becomes 
infected with worm at any given time of worm outbreak.   
III. RELATED WORK 
A. Empicircal Analysis of Zero-Day Worms  
Moore et al. [1] provided the analysis of Slammer worm 
based on reported worm outbreak data, while Shannon et al.  
[5] presented the analysis of Witty worm based on reported 
worm outbreak data.  But, as far as the authors of this paper 
are aware, no previous published work except [2] (which 
reports Slammer worm outbreak), has presented an infection 
and propagation analysis of any fast random scanning worm, 
Hit-list or Flash worm in a real isolated network with real 
worm outbreak conditions; which forms basis of this research 
work. 
B. Epidemiological Modeling of Computer Worms  
 Mathematical modeling helps us understand the 
epidemiology of worm outbreaks; which is further used to 
monitor and defend against spread of computer worms. 
Various authors have proposed such mathematical models [1, 
3,15,16,17] based on models originally developed for 
biological epidemiological studies [7,14].  Susceptible-
Infected (SI) [7,14] model is most widely reported biological 
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model, which models the epidemiology of infection by 
assuming population of hosts is of fixed size and relying on a 
deterministic contact coefficient to govern the differential 
between each step of the model.  Of note is another work 
undertaken by Zesheng et al. [18] that reports the discrete time 
deterministic model of active worms (the AAWP model), 
which characterizes the propagation of worms that employ 
random scanning and local subnet scanning.  It uses discrete 
time model and deterministic approximation to describe the 
spread of active worms.  
 The key advantage of mathematical models are their 
ability to model large network worm outbreaks with relatively 
low resource restrictions, but these mathematical models are 
limited in high level of network granularity due to their 
macroscopic nature. 
IV. PSEUDO-WORM SYSTEM DESIGN AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 
A. Basic Desing and Methodology 
 A random scanning worm such as Slammer, Code Red etc. 
uses pseudo random number generator to scan random IP 
addresses, whereas a hit-list worm such as Witty uses initially 
generated hit-list of susceptible hosts, embedded into it, to 
infect susceptible hosts on the internet.  Upon initial infection, 
a UDP based random scanning worm generates and sends a  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Worm Infection Process 
number of connection requests (defined by an attacker in the 
worm algorithm) to a number of random IP addresses in a unit  
interval of time (seconds or minutes).  Each new infected host, 
upon infection, follows the same process and starts scanning 
the further IP addresses, thereby, creating a chain reaction.  
Fig. 1 shows this worm infection process [15].  In each stage 
of infection, each infected host n further scans m no of hosts.  
In random scanning worm such as SQL Slammer, at first stage 
infection, one or two infected hosts starts the infection 
process; while in the case of hit-list scanning such as Witty, at 
first stage of infection, worm infected host contains lists of 
susceptible hosts, which will start the infection process at 
once. 
B. Pseudo-Worm System Design and Implementation 
The pseudo-worm daemon is implemented in C 
programming language.  C programming language is chosen 
to implement pseudo worm daemon due to its capability to 
access the systems low level functions, easily available open 
source, ease of use and platform independence.  The basic 
design of pseudo-worm daemon consists of three key 
components: 
1) UDP Client  
A UDP client program is used to launch the worm.  It can 
be installed on any host.  It sends a UDP based connection 
request to UDP server by using a by using a single packet; 
which includes destination IP address, port no and 
authentication string.  
2) UDP Server  
 A UDP server program is single threaded 
application that performs pseudo-worm like functionality.  
It can be installed on host in a network.  Upon receiving 
connection request from UDP client on user defined port 
number and IP addresses, it authenticate  the UDP client 
request to accept connection, sends the local time of 
connection to logging server and; turns it behaviour into 
client by sending further connection request to different 
destination IP addresses (generated by using random no 
generator).  The rate of UDP datagrams generated per 
second and the IP address pool from which random 
destination IP addresses are chosen (either by random 
scanning or hit-list scanning from local file) are user-
configurable parameters.  
3) Logging Server  
 The logging server program is installed on any host in a 
network to collect time of infection from UDP servers.  All 
hosts running UDP serves contains IP address of central 
logging server and upon infection, sends time of infection to 
logging server. 
C. Characteristics of Pseudo-Worm Daemon  
Following are key characteristics of the worm scanning 
daemon: 
1) UDP based Propagation   
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 A UDP based worm can propagate much faster than TCP 
based worm.   The designed pseudo worm daemon uses 
UDP as its propagation mechanism, thereby making it 
similar in functionality to SQL slammer and Witty worm. 
2) Pseudo Random Number Scanning   
 A pseudo random number generator (PRNG) is an 
algorithm for generating a sequence of numbers that 
approximates the properties of random numbers [19].  A 
random seed is used to initialize the PRNG.  Various type 
of PRNG exists but the implementation of pseudo worm 
daemon presented in this paper, uses complementary 
multiply-with-carry (CMWC) [20] type of pseudo random 
number.  CMWC method generates sequences of random 
integers based on an initial set from two to many thousands 
of randomly chosen seed values. The key advantages of the 
MWC method are: (a) it invokes simple computer integer 
arithmetic, (b) leads to very fast generation of sequences of 
random numbers with immense periods, ranging from 
around 260 to 22000000.  
3) Hit-List Scanning    
 A pre-generated list of susceptible IP address can be 
included into text file. The PWD reads the text file and 
sends connection requests to those IP addresses before 
switching to random scanning mode, thereby imitating the 
functionality of a hit-list worm like Witty. 
4) Containment 
 PWD has user- configurable random scanning pool, which 
can be defined inside it code. For example, generating IP 
addresses in one class A network size, or generating IP 
addresses in six class C networks, or generating IP address 
over whole internet space.  Hence, its random IP generation 
can be contained in any network size according to needs of 
the security experiment.  
5) Propagation rate  
 The number of random IP addresses scanned per second is 
defined as propagation rate of worm. For example, slammer 
generates 4000 IP addresses per second. PWD can be 
configured to scan at different propagation rate e.g. 100 
scans per seconds, 500 scans per seconds etc. 
6) Authentication 
 Any connection request from PWD contains an 
authentication string. Upon receiving a connection request, 
a host looks for authentication string, and if it finds the 
authentication string, it starts scanning new hosts.  This 
authentication mechanism is included into PWD for safety 
reasons.   
7) Logging and Reporting  
 Logging is process of recording events taking place in the 
execution of a system in order to provide an audit trial that 
can be used to understand the activity of the system and to 
diagnose problems [21].  The PWD includes logging server, 
which can be installed on any host.  Upon infection, a UDP 
server sends the IP address of infected host and time of 
infection (up to microseconds) to central logging server.  
The central logging server stores this information in a text 
file which can be processed to find time of infection of all 
infected hosts in the network.  
V. EXPERIMENTATION 
A. Witty Worm 
Shannon et al. [5] reported some key characteristics of 
Witty outbreak of 2004 which can be described as follows: 
 Susceptible population of Witty Worm was 12, 000 or 
between 2 and 3 hosts per million of entire IPV4 
address space. 
 Witty has variable datagram size, with an Ethernet 
frame size between 796 and 1307 bytes.  
 The average scanning rate of Witty was 357 datagrams 
per host per second during its entire infection period 
while the maximum recorded scanning rate of Witty 
was 970 datagrams per host per second.  
 Witty also contains an initial hit-list of 110 hosts which 
were reported to be infected in first 10 seconds of 
infection out of which 38 hosts are transferring 9700 
datagrams per host per second continuously for a 
period of an hour.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Experimental Setup and Depolyment Architecture of 
PWD 
B. Experimental Setup 
In order to empirically analyze the behavior of Witty 
worm, an experimental test network was configured on 
Virtualized Malware Testbed (VMT) [2], comprising of a 
two Class A IP address space 10.0.0.0/8 and 11.0.0.0/8 but 
divided into four subnets; 10.0.0.0/10, 10.128.0.0/9, 
11.0.0.0/9 and 10.128.0.0/9 as shown in Figure 2.  These four 
subnets are connected through a central router by using RIP, 
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configured on Quagga.  Four further Quagga based routers 
are implemented (one for each subnet).  One Linux based 
virtual machine is running in each subnet to provide a DHCP 
service and logging service for pseudo-worm daemon.  DSL 
is installed with the pseudo-worm daemon on each of the 
susceptible virtualized hosts.   All hosts in the network are 
time synchronized by using the Network Time Protocol 
(NTP).  The following fig. 2 shows experimental setup and; 
design and deployment architecture of PWD. 
C. Experimental Methodology 
As reported previously in section V.A, Witty has 3 hosts 
per million of the entire IPv4 addresses space were 
susceptible to infection with an average scan rate of 357 
datagrams per infected host per second.  A single class A 
network has 224 hosts, and so 2 class A will contain 224 * 
2(3/1,000,000) = 101 susceptible hosts.   On this basis, 101 
virtual machines with the PWD with Witty like attributes 
were deployed across the four subnets.  Each worm daemon 
was configured to scan within two class A network 
(10.0.0.0/8, 11.0.0.0/8) at a scanning rate of 357 scans per 
host per second (average scan rate of Witty Worm as reported 
by Shannon et al.) while using an initial hit-list of one 
infected host along with first infected host.   
D. Experimental Results 
Fig. 3 shows the results of a set of three experiments 
conducted for pseudo witty worm outbreak. In the first 
experiment, all 101 susceptible machines got infected in 96.22 
minutes.  In the second experiment, all 101 susceptible 
machines got infected in 95.16 minutes.  While in the third 
experiment, all 101 susceptible machines got infected in 94.46 
minutes. It has been noted that in the middle of outbreaks of 
all three experiments, curves apart due to statistical variations 
and follows s-shaped random constant spread curve pattern 
[15].  
Fig. 4 shows the comparison of real Witty worm outbreak 
of 2004 with pseudo-witty worm outbreak.  The average of 
three pseudo-witty worm outbreaks is plotted against the real 
witty worm outbreak of 2004 as reported by Shannon et al. 
[5].  Shannon et al. reported that real witty worm infected 
90% of its susceptible hosts within 45 minutes; while 100 % 
of infection took almost 140 minutes. But, the pseudo-witty 
experiments conducted by using PWD in test network, took 
almost 85 minutes to reach its 90 % of infection whereas 97 
minutes on average to infection in all machines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Experimental Results of Psuedo-Witty Worm 
Outbreak 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Psuedo-Witty Worm Outbreak vs. Shanon et al. Witty 
Worm Reported Data 
This difference is due to the fact that real Witty Worm 
outbreak contains an initial hit-list of 110 hosts, out of which 
38 infected hosts are transferring 9700 datagrams per host per 
second continuously for a period of an hour; whereas Pseudo-
Witty worm outbreak in the experiments used average scan 
rate of real Witty worm; which is 357 datagrams per host per 
second during its entire infection.  But, still results of pseudo-
witty worm outbreak are broadly comparable to real witty 
worm outbreak [5].       
E. Epidemiological Analysis and Discussion  
In order to further quantify the effectiveness of the 
countermeasures, we employed the susceptible-infected SI 
model [7], widely used to characterize the epidemiology of 
biological infections and proposed by Tidy et al [8] and Xiang 
et al [22] for similar use in characterizing the epidemiology of 
malware infections.  The basis of this model is set out in Eqn 
1, where I represents the number of infected hosts at time, t, N 
represents the total population size and β represents the 
contact coefficient.  The particular solution to Eqn 1 is set out 
in Eqn 2, where I0 represents the number of infected hosts at 
time t = 0.   
Fig. 6 plots the best fit SI model curve against the 
experimental data set for experiment one (25% hosts 
vulnerable and no countermeasure), showing the Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient [23], r, as well as the value of β for the 
SI model.  Fig. 5 plots the SI model curve against the data 
from experiment three.   
                    
𝑑𝐼
𝑑𝑡
=  𝛽. 𝐼. [𝑁 − 𝐼]                    
 
(1) 
 
          𝐼(𝑡) =
𝐼0
𝐼0 + [𝑁 − 𝐼0]. 𝑒−𝑁𝛽𝑡 
    
 
(2) 
 It is worthy of note that the value of the correlation 
coefficient, r = 0.99186, is quite close to 1, indicating the 
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ability of the SI model to represent the experimental data for 
random scanning worms such as Witty.   Furthermore, 
obtained experimental results also proved that Pseudo-Witty 
Worm outbreak follows random constant spread pattern. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Best Fit SI Model for Pseudo-Witty Worm 
Experimental Data 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper presented an architecture and design of a 
pseudo-worm daemon (PWD) for cyber-epidemiological 
analysis of zero-day network worms.  It has also reported its 
key characteristic of PWD such as; UDP based propagation, 
user- configurable random scanning pool, ability to contain 
user defined hit-list, authentication before infecting vulnerable 
machines and efficient logging of time of infection.  We have 
conduced series of experiments by using PWD with Witty 
worm attributes.  The experimental results are broadly 
comparable to real worm outbreak reported data. Furthermore, 
these results are quantified by using SI model. From base 
comparison of Witty worm results, it is concluded that PSD 
can be used as an effective tool to empirically analyze the 
propagation behavior of random scanning and hit-list worms 
and to test potential countermeasures. 
The PWD uses only UDP as its propagation mechanism.  
In terms of future work, TCP based propagation can be 
integrated into its design in order to conduct epidemiological 
experiments of TCP based worms and to empirically analyze 
their propagation behavior.  Furthermore, we also expect to 
experiment with a range of hypothetical worms such as Flash, 
Warhol [3,4], and to explore the applicability of PWD for 
characterizing their epidemiology.   
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